It has been eight months since President
Roh Moo-hyun took office. Everybody
knows Roh is a pro-North leader advocating
the ¡°sunshine policy¡± of his predecessor,
Kim Dae-jung. Both leaders firmly believe the
only solution to the insecurity and instability
on the Korean peninsula is reconciliation and
exchanges between the two Koreas. But internal
and external factors have kept President
Roh from implementing his own North
Korean policy of ¡°Peace and Prosperity¡± as he
had intended. Externally, the sudden outbreak
of the North¡¯s nuclear problem just
before Roh¡¯s election last December was a
major stumbling block. Because of this,
President Roh had to withhold his policy on
North Korea for the time being. Internally,
growing political and ideological divisions
within South Korean society, which led to his
surprise announcement that he would put
himself to a confidence vote, was another
obstacle to pursuing his North Korean policy.
The North Korean nuclear crisis was truly
the first test of the new Roh administration.
Immediately before and after his inauguration,
military tensions around the peninsula
rose significantly, as the North threatened the
security of all Northeast Asia with its nuclear
program. It restarted its nuclear power plant
in Yongbyon, which had been frozen for
almost a decade under the 1994 Geneva agreement
between Washington and Pyongyang.
The North engaged in further brinkmanship
by reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods at
Yongbyon to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
Estimations as to the progress of the
reprocessing are mixed. Some believe the
North has already finished the process and is
now able to produce up to six nuclear
weapons. Others argue the process still needs
several more months for completion.
Making matters worse, the 50-year
Korea-US alliance began to show
signs of weakening with the inauguration
of the new government.
President Roh¡¯s call for more independence
from US influence was probably
the single biggest reason for the
weakening of the alliance. At the
same time, the North tried to take
advantage of the situation by pitting
South Korea against the US.
Pyongyang has tried to drive a wedge
between the two blood allies by urging
South Koreans to choose between
inter-Korean cooperation and international
cooperation among Seoul and
its traditional allies. The rise of anti-US
feelings in the South, caused by the
accidental deaths of two school girls
in a traffic accident by a US military
vehicle, was another factor that served
to strain bilateral ties.
Domestically, things have not
gone well either. The election of the
liberal president has caused serious
social conflict, dividing South Koreans
by political belief, ideology and generation,
on top of preexisting
deep-rooted regional
antagonisms. People
who support the engagement
policy toward
North Korea demand the
continuation and even
strengthening of that
policy. On the other
hand, conservative
opponents have called
for an end to the policy,
which they believed has only
spoiled the North without leading
Pyongyang to undertake reform
and openness. That ideological divide
in the South has been exacerbated by
other social and economic conflicts
between the old establishment and
the new liberal forces surrounding
President Roh. The latest indication of
the seriousness of this division is
President Roh¡¯s recent pledge to submit
himself to a recall vote to ask
whether the people still have confidence
in his leadership.
Under these circumstances, it has
been difficult for the new government
to pursue its own policy toward the
North. Depending upon the external
and internal mood at the time, the
administration¡¯s policy has moved
from one extreme to another, giving
the impression that the new government
lacks a consistent North Korean
policy.
But as we all know, Korea is full of
surprises. In recent weeks, surprising
changes began
to occur,
most coming
from overseas.
With
the prolonged
Iraqi
dilemma, the Bush administration
began to soften its stance toward
Pyongyang, perhaps because the US
did not want to fight two wars at
once. The recent indication by
President Bush to allow written security
guarantees to the North in a multilateral
setting in exchange for the
North¡¯s scrapping of its nuclear program
was a major breakthrough.
Dropping its long-held demand for a
bilateral non-aggression treaty with
Washington, Pyongyang responded
positively by hinting at the possibility
of accepting Bush¡¯s proposal. It seems
the second round of six-way talks to
resolve the nuclear issue will take
place as soon as December in Beijing.
 
These developments could clear
up several key uncertainties regarding
external factors affecting inter-
Korean relations. If things go smoothly,
the nuclear standoff could be
reduced significantly, if not completely
ended, in the
near future.
A complete solution to the problem
would take time, but for the
moment, a temporary solution to
freeze the North¡¯s nuclear program
seems likely. An optimistic scenario
even includes the possibility of the
international society providing economic
assistance to Pyongyang, in
addition to security guarantees the
North has long wanted. The North
could gradually be invited into the
international community. US-North
Korea relations could improve to the
level envisioned by the Clinton
administration, in which the two sides
might even exchange liaison offices.
While such expectations may appear
naive and unrealistic today, they were
generally viewed as possible just three
short years ago.
One big uncertainty remains,
however: South Korea¡¯s domestic
political situation. President Roh has
called for a national referendum in
December, and National Assembly
elections are scheduled for next April.
A certain degree of disorder and even
chaos is not impossible. Given the
divisive nature of Korean politics, the
Roh administration will find it difficult
to pursue any major policy over
the next several months.
Despite the nuclear tension, South
and North Korea continue to carry
out ambitious inter-Korean cooperation
projects. Southern tourists continue
to visit the scenic Kumkang
Mountain on the North¡¯s eastern coast
in a tour program operated by
Hyundai. Ordinary South Koreans
also fly to Pyongyang as part of
another tour program, opening a new
age of air traffic between the two
Koreas. Construction work to reconnect
a railway and road across the
Demilitarized Zone, severed more
than five decades ago, is under way
for completion in the near future. A
large-scale industrial
complex will be built
in Gaeseong just
north of the
Demilitarized Zone
to house hundreds
and perhaps thousands
of South
Korean factories.
The project, which
is also being led by
Hyundai, could
rapidly change
Korea¡¯s economic
landscape as southern
factories take
advantage of the
North¡¯s cheap
workforce.
The inter-Korean
exchange programs
have to a large
degree contributed
to the containment of
the nuclear problem
for the last several
months. Without
such wide and active
exchanges between
the two Koreas, the
nuclear tensions
could have intensified
to a dangerous
level.
However, many South Koreans
are become impatient because the
changes in the North produced by the
engagement policy have been much
slower than expected. Some South
Koreans complain that the North only
takes advantage of
the situation and
shows no sincerity in
its dealings with the
South. As an example,
the North recently
caused a small
ruckus in Jeju Island,
the venue of an inter-
Korean cultural festival,
demanding
higher payment for
their participation.
The South Korean
tour program to
Pyongyang was also
suddenly suspended,
as the North
claimed it lacked sufficient
fuel oil to provide
visitors from the
South with warm
accommodations.
This problem
grows as the South
Korean government
fails to demonstrate
firm leadership.
There is an old
Korean saying that
one can rule the
world only after controlling
one¡¯s own
household. It is high time the South
did a little housecleaning.
|