November-December   2003
 
 
It has been eight months since President Roh Moo-hyun took office. Everybody knows Roh is a pro-North leader advocating the ¡°sunshine policy¡± of his predecessor, Kim Dae-jung. Both leaders firmly believe the only solution to the insecurity and instability on the Korean peninsula is reconciliation and exchanges between the two Koreas. But internal and external factors have kept President Roh from implementing his own North Korean policy of ¡°Peace and Prosperity¡± as he had intended. Externally, the sudden outbreak of the North¡¯s nuclear problem just before Roh¡¯s election last December was a major stumbling block. Because of this, President Roh had to withhold his policy on North Korea for the time being. Internally, growing political and ideological divisions within South Korean society, which led to his surprise announcement that he would put himself to a confidence vote, was another obstacle to pursuing his North Korean policy.

The North Korean nuclear crisis was truly the first test of the new Roh administration. Immediately before and after his inauguration, military tensions around the peninsula rose significantly, as the North threatened the security of all Northeast Asia with its nuclear program. It restarted its nuclear power plant in Yongbyon, which had been frozen for almost a decade under the 1994 Geneva agreement between Washington and Pyongyang. The North engaged in further brinkmanship by reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods at Yongbyon to produce weapons-grade plutonium. Estimations as to the progress of the reprocessing are mixed. Some believe the North has already finished the process and is now able to produce up to six nuclear weapons. Others argue the process still needs several more months for completion.

Making matters worse, the 50-year Korea-US alliance began to show signs of weakening with the inauguration of the new government. President Roh¡¯s call for more independence from US influence was probably the single biggest reason for the weakening of the alliance. At the same time, the North tried to take advantage of the situation by pitting South Korea against the US. Pyongyang has tried to drive a wedge between the two blood allies by urging South Koreans to choose between inter-Korean cooperation and international cooperation among Seoul and its traditional allies. The rise of anti-US feelings in the South, caused by the accidental deaths of two school girls in a traffic accident by a US military vehicle, was another factor that served to strain bilateral ties.

Domestically, things have not gone well either. The election of the liberal president has caused serious social conflict, dividing South Koreans by political belief, ideology and generation, on top of preexisting deep-rooted regional antagonisms. People who support the engagement policy toward North Korea demand the continuation and even strengthening of that policy. On the other hand, conservative opponents have called for an end to the policy, which they believed has only spoiled the North without leading Pyongyang to undertake reform and openness. That ideological divide in the South has been exacerbated by other social and economic conflicts between the old establishment and the new liberal forces surrounding President Roh. The latest indication of the seriousness of this division is President Roh¡¯s recent pledge to submit himself to a recall vote to ask whether the people still have confidence in his leadership.

Under these circumstances, it has been difficult for the new government to pursue its own policy toward the North. Depending upon the external and internal mood at the time, the administration¡¯s policy has moved from one extreme to another, giving the impression that the new government lacks a consistent North Korean policy.

But as we all know, Korea is full of surprises. In recent weeks, surprising changes began to occur, most coming from overseas. With the prolonged Iraqi dilemma, the Bush administration began to soften its stance toward Pyongyang, perhaps because the US did not want to fight two wars at once. The recent indication by President Bush to allow written security guarantees to the North in a multilateral setting in exchange for the North¡¯s scrapping of its nuclear program was a major breakthrough. Dropping its long-held demand for a bilateral non-aggression treaty with Washington, Pyongyang responded positively by hinting at the possibility of accepting Bush¡¯s proposal. It seems the second round of six-way talks to resolve the nuclear issue will take place as soon as December in Beijing.

 
These developments could clear up several key uncertainties regarding external factors affecting inter- Korean relations. If things go smoothly, the nuclear standoff could be reduced significantly, if not completely ended, in the near future.

A complete solution to the problem would take time, but for the moment, a temporary solution to freeze the North¡¯s nuclear program seems likely. An optimistic scenario even includes the possibility of the international society providing economic assistance to Pyongyang, in addition to security guarantees the North has long wanted. The North could gradually be invited into the international community. US-North Korea relations could improve to the level envisioned by the Clinton administration, in which the two sides might even exchange liaison offices. While such expectations may appear naive and unrealistic today, they were generally viewed as possible just three short years ago.

One big uncertainty remains, however: South Korea¡¯s domestic political situation. President Roh has called for a national referendum in December, and National Assembly elections are scheduled for next April. A certain degree of disorder and even chaos is not impossible. Given the divisive nature of Korean politics, the Roh administration will find it difficult to pursue any major policy over the next several months.

Despite the nuclear tension, South and North Korea continue to carry out ambitious inter-Korean cooperation projects. Southern tourists continue to visit the scenic Kumkang Mountain on the North¡¯s eastern coast in a tour program operated by Hyundai. Ordinary South Koreans also fly to Pyongyang as part of another tour program, opening a new age of air traffic between the two Koreas. Construction work to reconnect a railway and road across the Demilitarized Zone, severed more than five decades ago, is under way for completion in the near future. A large-scale industrial complex will be built in Gaeseong just north of the Demilitarized Zone to house hundreds and perhaps thousands of South Korean factories. The project, which is also being led by Hyundai, could rapidly change Korea¡¯s economic landscape as southern factories take advantage of the North¡¯s cheap workforce.

The inter-Korean exchange programs have to a large degree contributed to the containment of the nuclear problem for the last several months. Without such wide and active exchanges between the two Koreas, the nuclear tensions could have intensified to a dangerous level.

However, many South Koreans are become impatient because the changes in the North produced by the engagement policy have been much slower than expected. Some South Koreans complain that the North only takes advantage of the situation and shows no sincerity in its dealings with the South. As an example, the North recently caused a small ruckus in Jeju Island, the venue of an inter- Korean cultural festival, demanding higher payment for their participation. The South Korean tour program to Pyongyang was also suddenly suspended, as the North claimed it lacked sufficient fuel oil to provide visitors from the South with warm accommodations.

This problem grows as the South Korean government fails to demonstrate firm leadership. There is an old Korean saying that one can rule the world only after controlling one¡¯s own household. It is high time the South did a little housecleaning.

The writer is a journalist based in Seoul.
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